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Abstract 
We look at business survey data on Italian internationalized firms’ characteristics and performances since the outbreak of 
the crisis until 2012. Among  Italian  firms with 20 employees or more, an increasing share (from 7.1 to 13.2% between 
2006 and 2011) owns a foreign productive unit. Nearly half of such units were located in developing countries. The main 
reason for locating units in advanced countries is to be close to outlet markets, this remains true for internationalization in 
developing countries even though in this case the search for lower costs becomes more important. In line with empirical 
research based on data from several countries, Italian multinationals are on average more productive and profitable, even 
when compared to exporting firms not operating abroad. More specifically, the productivity gap compared to these latter 
firms is 15 percent, closely aligned with that measured by Helpman at al. (2004) on a sample of US firms. In the years 
2007-2012, internationalized firms’ operating profit, as well as their labor utilization in Italy, were above both the general 
average and that of other exporting firms. In firms’ opinion, the support by Italian public institutions to expand their 
foreign activity is generally not effective. 
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1. Introduction 
Firms can gain access to foreign markets in three ways: 1) by exporting their goods, 2) by forming various 
kinds of partnerships with foreign companies, 3) by setting up subsidiaries in target countries (in the form of 
either ownership/control of foreign companies or direct ownership of local units. A rapidly growing body of 
literature finds that these three strategies are hierarchically ordered, since exporting firms are more productive 
and bigger, compared to firms serving only their home market. The productivity is even higher for firms with 
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forms of international outsourcing or partnership with foreign firms. Finally, performances become strongly 
superior for firms with some functions carried out in countries different from that of their headquarters 
(Helpman et al., 2004; Helpman, 2006). This latter strategy has been expanding on a world scale in the last 
two decades. The aim of our paper is to look at the diffusion of the internationalization among Italian firms, 
the most salient features of its evolution and its drivers, as well as internationalized firms’ economic 
performance throughout the Great Crisis. 
2. The data 
The first component of the integrated database we used (realized by Borin and Mancini, 2013 and indicated 
with B&M database from now on) is the Invind business survey, carried out every year by the Bank of Italy 
since 1984 on a representative sample of Italian manufacturing firms, at first with 50 employees or more, with 
firms with 20-49 employees included since 2001. The survey provides a comprehensive picture on firms’ 
investment, employment, turnover and financing, as well as other relevant structural features. The survey has 
collected data on the topics of internationalization by specific questionnaire sections for four editions of the 
survey, the last one in 2011 (Bank of Italy, 2011). These survey data were exactly matched with additional 
data sources on firms’ foreign activity.  
3. The diffusion of internationalization among Italian firms 
The diffusion of internationalization among Italian firms increased between 2004 and 2011, with the bulk 
of the increase occurred in the last five years of the period considered. The big firms play a leading role. In 
2011, one third of the Italian non-construction industrial firms with 50 employees or more were 
internationalized (they were less than a quarter in 2004, fig. 1a). The share of internationalized firms is lower 
in the non-financial services sector: only 24 per cent of the firms of the same class size was internationalized 
in 2011, even if also in this sector the share had been markedly on the rise since 2004. The same pattern 
occurs for firms with 20 employees and over, with the difference that their share of internationalized firms is 
lower, as one should expect, given the fixed costs incurred in any internationalization process, seldom 
sustainable by smaller firms with 20-49 employees (fig. 1b). 
(a) 50 employees or more (b) 20 employees or more 
 
Figure 1 – Per cent of Italian internationalized firms 
Source: B&M database (2013). 
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Even if the internationalization process tend to be positively correlated with firm size, the greatest increase 
in its diffusion regarded the firms with 50-199 employees. This means that the diffusion of internationalization 
increasingly affects relatively smaller firms (these firms are a peculiarity of the Italian industrial system and 
are called “pocket multinationals” or “firms of the fourth capitalism”). 
The sample we examine comprises 805 internationalized firms, with 200 among them becoming so during 
the economic downturn that started in 2007. The average size of these latter firms (108 employees) is smaller 
than that of the of the firms that internationalized before (207). The recently internationalized firms are less 
productive (in terms of per capita added value), less capitalized and less innovation-oriented (if we measure 
their research and development expenses and their share of white collars). However, the opposite causal effect 
might be at work: firm size, innovation and productivity might greatly benefit by investing abroad (a learning 
effect outlined by the literature). Hence, recently internationalized firms might be in a catching-up phase. 
4. Where do Italian internationalized firms go and why do they go there? 
The B&M database provides a reliable description of the destination countries of the internationalized 
Italian firms, aligned with that derived from official statistical data (Fats, tab. 1). In 2011, more than half the 
presences of the Italian internationalized firms is in advanced countries, mainly in Europe, with a relevant 
presence in the United States, principal destination outside the European Union. Among the other emerging or 
developing countries, the countries of central and eastern Europe play a leading role (Romania is the leader 
among them). As for the other emerging countries, China has become an important destination in the last 
decade (3.5% of the presences are located there in 2010), while Brazil maintains its relevance (5.4%). 
Table 1 – Location of Italian internationalized firms’ foreign affiliates (per cent) 
In the 2011 Invind survey, firms reported the main reasons why they had internationalized: we assess 
whether such reasons change according to the foreign investment location. Some results are not in line with 
the usual apriori, while some others have already been outlined in the literature. The most frequent reason for 
choosing to produce abroad is the proximity to potential markets (44.6% of answers). Besides that, an 
important reason for internationalizing in developing countries is lower labor costs (26.2% of cases), that 
becomes negligible (3.5% of cases) when advanced countries are the target destination (tab. 2). Mergers and 
acquisitions made in order to improve market shares or to acquire new technologies or strategic patents are 
quite rare and limited almost exclusively to firms internationalizing towards advanced countries. 
B&M database FATS 2009
Advanced countries 58.4 63.3
Euro Area 29.9 35.5
United Kingdom 5.3 5.5
United Stated 8.9 7.7
Other advanced countries 12.1 14.6
Developing countries 41.6 36.7
Romania 3.7 2.5
Poland 2.6 2.9
Russia 2.4 1.8
Other eastern european countries 8.0 6.6
India 2.5 2.2
China 3.5 3.3
Brazil 5.4 4.5
Other developing countries 15.8 12.8
Total 100.0 100.0
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Table 2 – Motivations of Italian firms’ internationalization(1) 
Source: Invind survey (2011). 
(1) Per cent of firms. - (2) “Other motivations” also includes less stringent environmental and fiscal rules, as well as cheaper raw materials. 
Since similar questions had been asked in the 2006 survey, we see that the search of more favorable 
legislations and of labor-saving solutions became less frequent after 2006. This can be interpreted as a 
growing need to find markets more promising than the domestic ones, depressed because of the economic 
crisis (ICE, 2012). 
5. Assessing the internationalization premium 
Helpman et al. (2004) propose a simple explanation of the relationship between productivity and 
internationalization. It is based on a model where each firm decides whether to serve only its internal market 
or even foreign ones. In the second case, each firm decide whether to serve foreign markets by exporting or 
producing directly abroad. The decision depends on fixed costs for exporting and producing abroad, 
transportation and loss of economies of scale. Three categories of firms emerge, according to minimum 
productivity thresholds. The authors show that for a panel of US firms, the positive productivity spread (in 
terms of per capita turnover) of internationalized firms compared to simple exporting ones is 15% 
(corresponding to half the advantage of exporting firms over those serving exclusively the US internal 
market). 
We repeated this analysis on our sample if Italian firms, using the same dependent (log of per capita 
turnover) and we got very similar results. In line with the approach of Helpman et al., we included sector-level 
dummies (denoted with X), as well as the log of both the capital stock (lkl) and of its squared value (lklsq). We 
introduced two dummies to assess the possible advantage of serving foreign markets: Desp is equal to one if the 
firm exports a part of its sales but is not internationalized and Dmne, equal to one in presence of an 
internationalized firms. This is the form of the equation we estimated (the subscript j indicates the generic 
firm): 
jjjjjjj DmneDesplklsqblklbXbb HJJS  213210 '    (1) 
( 12 JJ  ) indicates the prize of being an internationalized firm, measured in terms of per capita turnover. It 
amounts to 19%, quite similar to the value found for the US enterprises. Symmetrically, the premium of 
exporting over exclusively serving the Italian internal market, indicated with 1J , is 37%, in line with Helpman 
Lower labor 
costs
High demand in 
the local market 
or neighboring 
markets
Proximity to 
customers or 
suppliers
Acquisition of 
competitor 
firms/sharing of 
technologies or 
patents
Other 
motivations(2)
Total
Advanced countries 3.5 61.1 15.4 4.8 15.2 100.0
Developing countries 26.2 26.0 28.9 1.7 17.2 100.0
Advanced countries 0.0 60.6 12.4 0.0 27.0 100.0
Developing countries 3.6 56.0 13.6 0.0 26.8 100.0
Manufacturing
Non-financial services
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et al.’s result of 39% (fig. 2a). The results do not change with alternative productivity measures, more suitable 
to catch the actual price in terms of efficiency. If we use per capita value added and TFP, the 
internationalization prize is respectively equal to 14% and 19%. If we divide the internationalized firms 
according to whether they are mainly present in advanced or developing countries, no significant productivity 
advantage emerges for the former ones (fig. 2b). 
(a) internationalized firms vs non internationalized exporting firms  (b) internationalization in advanced countries vs internationalization in developing countries (1) 
 
Figure 2 – Italian manufacturing: productivity premium (%) of internationalized firms 
Source: Helpman, et al. (2004) and B&M database (2013). 
(1) Foreign geographical area where internationalized firms are mainly located. 
6. The effects of  the long crisis on the three types of firms: “domestic”, simple exporters, 
internationalized 
The export-oriented firms were most acutely struck by the sudden contraction of world demand during the 
first part of the crisis, which started in 2007-2008. Such contraction gradually propagated to the rest of the 
Italian production chain (Bugamelli et al.2010; Accetturo and Giunta, 2013). The second phase ushered in a 
weak and uncertain recovery (soon interrupted by a new downturn) that mostly benefited the Italian firms 
active in international markets, as opposed to the growing difficulties faced by “domestic” firms. The turnover 
trends estimated from our sample shows how the two phases of the long crisis were so different. In the first 
part (2007-2009), the turnover dropped for more than 75% of manufacturing firms and 62% of those 
belonging to non-financial services, in both sectors such a share was higher among firms that either exported 
or were internationalized (fig. 3a). In the second phase of the crisis (2009-2012), the total share of firms that 
saw their turnover dropping decreased (down to 50% of manufacturing firms and 60% of non-financial 
services firms) almost exclusively because of the rise of exporting and internationalized firms’ sales. During 
the crisis, firms amply made use of the Wage Supplementation Fund, a wage scheme by which workers 
remain in the firm’s stable workforce even if they work a reduced number of hours and part of their wages are 
paid by the Italian Social Security. They did so as an attempt of labor hoarding (see Bugamelli et al., 2010) 
and, as a consequence, total employment figures (that include these particular workers) might provide a 
biased picture of the crisis effect on labor. This is why we prefer to examine the trends of hours actually 
worked: as foreseeable, they shrank in the manufacturing sector, chiefly among exporting and 
internationalized firms that suffered from the sudden drop of worldwide demand (fig. 3b). In the second part 
of the crisis, the share of firms with a decrease of total hours worked drastically decreases for firms active in 
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international markets, as opposed to a much smaller contraction of the same share (down to slightly more than 
50%) for “domestic” firms. 
(a) Decreasing turnover (b) Decreasing hours worked  
Figure 3 – Per cent of firms with decreasing turnover or decreasing hours worked in the two phases of the crisis 
Source: B&M database (2013). 
Internationalized firms, together with simple exporting companies, probably at first took the worst hit 
from the worldwide slump of demand, but significantly recovered afterwards. However, we could expect that 
firms’ behaviors feature high heterogeneity levels within the previously defined firm categories and that 
variables like size, productivity and sector-level specialization might be additional factors in explaining 
internationalized firms’ better performances. We assess the role of these additional factors by a multivariate 
analysis, which can measure the actual contribution of internationalization conditionally on the their presence. 
We run two separate regressions for the two periods 2007-2009 and 2009-2012, given the peculiarities of the 
two periods. Firms’ performances will be measured in terms of turnover and employment, as well as in terms 
of hours worked, which account for the different firm propensities to use the Wage Supplementation Fund. 
The covariate set includes: a matrix X of sector-level indicators, as well as dummies for the location in Italy of 
the firms’ headquarters. We then include an array of controls correlated with the degree of involvement in 
foreign markets: log of the size in terms of number of employees, productivity, measured both in terms of per 
capita value added and Total Factor Productivity, per capita capital stock, share of white collars and finally 
some variables pertaining to firm organization (such as a couple of dummies signaling group affiliation and 
the presence of multiple Italian production sites). Since our main interest is studying the ceteris paribus effect 
on firm performances of serving foreign markets exclusively from Italy or by relying on an international 
structure, our analysis will focus on 4 dummies:  
x the first is equal to one if the firm was an exporter in the pre-crisis year 2006 ( Desp );  
x the second is equal to one for firms that began to export only after 2006 ( 0711Desp );  
x the third ( Dmne ) is equal to one for firms already internationalized in 2006;  
x the fourth and last ( 0711Dmne ) identifies with value one the firms that chose to become 
internationalized during the crisis.  
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We estimate the following equation: 
tjjjjjjjj
jjjjjjtj
DmlocDgroupskilledlklsqlklTFPlva
lsizeDmneDmneDespDespXcy
,06,806,706,606,506,406,306,2
06,111,406,311,206,106,, ...07110711'
HJJJJJJJ
JEEEED

 '
 (2) 
where the dependents are the log variation of turnover, employees and hours worked in the two periods 
considered. All the controls are referred to 2006, hence we do not take into account possible changes occurred 
during the crisis to avoid problems of endogeneity. In the first period (2007-2009), exporting firms’ 
performances were worse than average, due to the strong reduction of worldwide demand (see Bugamelli et 
al. 2010). This is clearly shown by the coefficient 1E associated to the dummy Desp , amounting to a turnover 
drop for exporting firms of around 2% greater than that recorded by “domestic” firms. On the contrary, firms 
already internationalized in 2006 had turnover trends closely aligned with those of “domestic” companies, as 
measured by the coefficient 3E . The most interesting finding is that, even in the first part of the crisis, firms 
that chose to open to foreign markets, either by exporting or by internationalizing, had turnover variations 
significantly better than those of “domestic” firms (respectively by 5.5% for new exporters, by 7% for 
recently internationalized firms, tab. 3). 
Looking at hours worked trends in the first part of the crisis, firms already exporting before the crisis cut them 
by 1.3% more than “domestic” firms did, but internationalized firms managed to contain their cuts. The 
differences between firms actively present in international markets and those with only Italian customers grew 
in the second part of the crisis (2009-2012), when internationalized or exporting firms’ turnover rose by more 
than 10%, compared with that of “domestic” firms. These latter firms had also better trends in terms of hours 
worked. These results did not depend on whether the decision to expand beyond the national borders was 
taken before or during the crisis. The magnitudes and the signs of the coefficients of the other covariates 
confirm some well-known facts: for instance, rising productivity levels (measured in terms of per capita added 
value or TFP in the pre-crisis year 2007) are positively associated with positive trends of turnover, 
employment and hours worked during the crisis. Group affiliation, an indicator of complex organizational 
structures, also probably benefited firms, while the share of white collars (a proxy of workforce qualification) 
and the presence of multiple plants in Italy apparently did not enhance firms’ performances. Looking at 
economic sector effects, traditional manufacturing and basic metals and engineering registered significantly 
worse-than-average performances in the first part of the crisis. In conclusion, internationalized firms seem to 
have fared better during the recent years’ difficult economic cycle. The effect of other firm characteristics, 
such as size, was somewhat weaker than what one would have expected for Italy from previous studies (see 
for example Bugamelli et al. 2010 and Bank of Italy 2012) and deserves further research. 
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Table 3 – Manufacturing: turnover, workforce and worked hours(1) 
 
Source: B&M database (2013). 
Significance levels are beside the corresponding coefficient (*= between 5 and 10%, **=between 1 and 5%, ***=less than 1%). Standard 
errors computed with White’s correction for heteroskedasticity.  
 (1) variation (log), extreme values outside the range defined by 1st and 99st percentiles not considered. - (2) Except for dummies referring to 
the degree of openness to international markets, all the variables are referred at the year 2006. Geographical-area dummies not shown for 
brevity. - (3) Coefficients of linear and quadratic terms multiplied by 100 - (4) The different sample sizes in the two time periods are due to the 
Invind survey panel attrition. 
7. The support of state institutions to internationalization efforts: firms’ opinions 
A peculiarity of Italy’s economy is the high number of small firms that increasingly entered into 
global markets, together with greater companies, see Mariotti and Mutinelli 2012). This factor makes it 
necessary to understand the public support to the internationalization of the Italian firms, since its role might 
be more relevant for small-sized ones. A complete assessment of public intervention is quite a complex task, 
particularly when its effectiveness must be measured (Vergara - Caffarelli and Veronese, 2013). We simply 
measure firms’ perceptions of the validity of public support to internationalization processes (tab. 4). 
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Table 4 – Italian firms’ opinions of public institutions’ support to internationalization(1) 
 
Source: Invind survey (2011). 
(1) Per cent of firms. - (2) Top management considered the possibility of producing goods or services abroad in 2007-2011, but did not do it. 
However biased they could be, they are relevant, since firms are the direct beneficiaries of any form of 
support from state bodies. It emerges that public support is seldom required: only one internationalized firms 
of the manufacturing sector out of seven sought it to receive information or financial support. Even less were 
the internationalized firms of non-financial services sectors that demanded public assistance. It happened 
more often (for 40% of internationalized manufacturing firms) that companies asked financial intermediaries 
to finance internationalization. Financial support required to financial intermediaries comes at a cost, which 
makes it not directly comparable with that obtained from the state sector, and was accepted in 80% of cases. 
The firms that had only considered to become internationalized, but then gave up such proposal, asked for 
information support from state bodies with similar frequency, even if it wa satisfied less frequently. These 
firms tended to request public or private forms of financial support less frequently and more often were 
denied it. 
8. Conclusions 
Among Italian industrial firms with 20 employees or more, the share of internationalized firms grew 
from 7.1% to 13.2% in the years 2006-2011. Almost half the presences abroad is in developing countries. 
Internationalized production is most relevant for bigger firms with 500 employees or more, but also the share 
of firms with 50-199 employees active outside Italy significantly increased.  
Our data support the theoretical models according to which internationalization is strictly related to 
an evolutionary path, whereby scarcely productive and innovative firms tend to serve only their internal 
markets and manage to compete in worldwide markets when their productivity increases. When productivity 
reaches a certain threshold, it triggers internationalization processes that tend to associate with economic 
performances better than those of “domestic” firms and of simple exporters. The productivity advantage of 
Italian internationalized firms (15%, in terms of per capita added value) is analogous to that measured in other 
advanced countries. Besides, internationalized firms are more inclined to invest (in research and development 
too) and at the same time their workforce is more qualified. In Italy, internationalized firms weathered the 
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but not 
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Internationalized firms 0.7 14.5 3.0 15.0 4.5 35.3
firms with less than 500 employees 0.6 13.9 2.9 14.6 4.6 34.7
Firms abandoning internationalization projects(2) 4.4 14.6 5.2 2.0 10.5 5.6
firms with less than 500 employees 4.4 14.7 5.3 2.0 10.5 5.6
Internationalized firms 0.2 3.1 1.7 6.1 5.6 41.1
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terrible crisis of the five years 2007-2012 better than non-internationalized companies. In the first phase of the 
crisis (2007-2009), internationalized and exporting firms took the direct hit of the worldwide slump of 
demand, that gradually transmitted its negative effects down the production chain. The following recovery, 
that turned out to be short-lived, was driven by exporting or internationalized firms, while “domestic” firms’ 
straits became even worse. Our econometric estimates show that, after conditioning for a wide array of 
observable firm characteristics, internationalization associated with better-than-average results in terms of 
turnover and employment. The main motivation why firms shifted or broadened their production capacity 
abroad was to be close to important outlets and, secondarily, the proximity to suppliers. Nevertheless, lower 
labor costs were the main motivation for around 25% of the firms mainly internationalized in developing 
countries. The Italian system of public support to firms’ internationalization efforts is quite complex and 
therefore difficult to evaluate in terms of cost-benefit analysis. This is why firms’ opinions are an important 
evaluation tool: according to them, state support was scarcely used and left them particularly unsatisfied when 
they asked for financial support. These difficulties become most relevant in light of the result shown in the 
paper about Italian firms’ performances during the first part of the crisis and the following uncertain recovery. 
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